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THE UNITED STATES, SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPECTRE OF CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT: Ever since the Caribbean islands were decolonized, the development predicament of these island nations has been interpreted with respect to their physical properties and the consequences that those properties generated. This work, however, proposes to look at the "wider spectre" of the Caribbean development by bringing the dimensions of the United States, security and diplomacy and appreciates these variables in a stated framework of "development-security nexus". It takes into account the concern which aptly thinks that there is a dominant American articulation of the development-security nexus probably made overt by the events of 9/11 that again privileges the security angle of the nexus. It further argues that the Caribbean region cannot shy away from the prevailing context but has to confront the dominant articulation of the nexus by adopting a diplomatic viewpoint with the aim of a positive image-construction by strategically exploiting the regional credentials that fall between the "third world" poverty and "first world" riches.

Keywords: Caribbean small island developing states (SIDS), United States, development-security nexus, diplomacy, regionalism, 9/11

I. Introduction

This study aims to explore the United States, security and diplomacy as the three mutually constituting elements of the spectre of Caribbean[1]

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1. The term "Caribbean" is variously conceived. However, it refers to the small island developing states (SIDS) in this study that are located in the Eastern side of the Caribbean Sea.

development in four parts. The following first part illustrates an outline of the "security-development nexus" –an important contemporary approach on the problems of the small islands, among others– within the space constrained as well as enabled by the diversified conceptions of the canonical terms of development and security. This part also substantiates this outline with functional examples of migration and tourism to underscore how an "either-or" approach –the conventional manner of looking at the Caribbean development problems– is obsolete. The second part of the study recognizes that there exists a dominant articulation, the American one in particular, of the nexus that privileges its caricatured security angle and portrays the Caribbean islands negatively owing to their small territorial size. Here this work notes the "foreign context" that the dominant force articulates for its own pre-conceived security interests and renders the Caribbean insecure and vulnerable. The following part thus proposes a diplomatic point-of-view and argues that the Caribbean states cannot shy away from the nexus. They have to rather opt for a strategy of positive image-building and simultaneously attack the dominant nucleus of the nexus where their in-betweenity (i.e., between the first and the third worlds) as well as the small size may prove vital strategic assets. It finally remarks to avoid seeing the diplomatic point as "internally paradoxical" simply because it proposes the similar issues for the endeavour that the dominant interest may utilize in its own favour. Such thinking seems naive and runs contrary to the very essence of diplomacy. The wiser side would look at the diplomatic viewpoint (through the development-security nexus) as a yardstick to improve on the learning curve critical for the Caribbean development.

Thus, the reason for considering the said constituting elements of the problem is obvious due to the fact that the presence of the United States is steady in the Caribbean development discourse and this has been made explicit by the United States sometimes by either declaring itself a "Caribbean state" or announcing the Caribbean as the "third America border". The "homeland security" concern, moreover, has been ingrained in those declarations of the United States, increasing the role of diplomacy for the Caribbean states. The concern with development in the Caribbean small island has an intimate relationship with these states' physical properties and the consequent politico-economic identity(s) that those properties generate. The properties are small geographical and population size, relatively small natural resource endowments, prone to natural hazards as these are surrounded by the sea, proximity to powerful neighbouring states like the United States in particular. The concern with the physical properties of a nation might not get explicitly expressed in all the cases, it is explicit and direct for the Caribbean owing to the small size of its sovereign entities that lend them a radically different character in the eyes of an observer. The other thing that enters the

purview of observation while engaging with the Caribbean development is the interplay of the economic forces that has always been at a wider level and has involved the powerful empires of the world, be it Spain, the Great Britain or the United States. In other words, the small size of the Caribbean nations and the powerful international forces have significantly shaped the trajectory of the Caribbean development, and these are the issues often highlighted in the concerned circles.

Duly acknowledging these issues, this work brings in the United States, security and diplomacy in the spectre of the Caribbean development with the aim to demonstrate these accompanying constituents of this region's development and their significance for the Caribbean in a dynamic world environment. In so doing, the work employs a contemporary evolving framework of development-security nexus where development and security intersect each other presumably for mutual benefit and optimum outcome.

II. Development-Security Nexus

As one begins with the idea of development-security intersection or nexus, the definitions of the very terms (i.e., development and security) confront their further elucidations, and it is quite expected as these terms are canonical as far as their scope of study and applications are concerned. It is clearly known that there are various schools of thought with further variations on development and security, one can expect disagreements on any single definition of these canonical terms. This work too does not aim at bringing about the nuances concerning the enterprise of definition. It, however, employs the working definitions of development and security for the purpose of advancing the idea of the nexus between the two. In this work, therefore, development refers to the "prevalence of certain socio-economic indicators necessary for a good life", whereas security refers to the "absence of threats to the socially acquired values".

There could be various opinions as to what constitute the "necessary socio-economic indicators" as well as the "absence of threats", there is a general agreement that the contemporary discourses on development and security have followed a common path which is usually phrased as "broadening" and "deepening" of these concepts (Krause and Williams, 1996). Some phrase it differently saying that the domains of development and security have been "humanized" and "globalized" (Stern and Ojendal, 2010). The mode and style of expressions might not be similar in all the occasions, they commonly attest to the fact that security and development –as societal goals and as policies to achieve these goals– are now surrounded by a new international

environment which, with its constant workout, is allowing these discrete processes to walk along a shared trajectory.

Whether this walk along a shared trajectory has occurred because of the release of the international order from bipolar discipline or the unconventional actors and issues such as ethnic conflicts, international migration, problems with refugee, poverty, terrorism, organized crimes, and climate change sharing the legitimate sphere of participation, the thinking and practice of development and security seem to have taken place in a manner that do not intend to disrespect each other's spill-over effects. As a result, a concern has generated to study the interface between the aspects of security and development in which a growing awareness of both the development cost of conflict and the impact of economic and social development on security conditions, as Tarje Rod-Larsen (2010, p.vii) indicates, bears special significance. It was further proclaimed by the United Nations in the 2005 World Summit Outcome that "without security there is no development, and without development there is no security" (Tschirgi *et al.* 2010, p.2; Rod-Larsen, 2010, p.vii), indicating that a search for the *nexus* between development and security has caught urgency (Tschirgi *et al.* 2010; Duffield, 2010; Pupavac, 2010; Hetne, 2010; Orjuela, 2010; Jensen, 2010; Stern and Ojendal, 2010). Further, this search for a development-security nexus has taken place within the stated context when it is widely realized that neither the meaning of security nor of development has an agreed precision.

L. Erskine Sandiford, the Prime Minister of Barbados, had publicly proclaimed way back in 1990:

> Our vulnerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to hurricanes and earthquakes; economically, to market conditions taken elsewhere; socially, to cultural penetration; and now politically, to the machinations of terrorists, mercenaries, and criminals (Griffith, 2003, p. 5).

There seems no harm in considering Prime Minister Sandiford's proclamation a kind of proposition that had contained the seeds of an outlook containing the term "vulnerability" (in manifold) which could cover the Caribbean concerns, images and identity(s) that are often discussed in isolation either from development vantage-point or from security angle. For its further elucidation, a pair of examples from the Caribbean –the example of migration and of tourism– can be useful to understanding how the development-security nexus surfaces in this island-studded region.[2]

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2. The examples here of migration and tourism are merely for illustrative and

It is a plain reality that migration has almost become a household-norm and a necessity for the Caribbean societies where it works as an exit-point for its work-force and reduces the rate of unemployment which could otherwise negatively impact the societies. It is also, however, seen as a source of brain-drain and loss of critical skills from the region. But the point in the given context is whether migration for the Caribbean constitutes only an economic issue. The conventional argument is that the citizens from the Caribbean countries migrate to the prosperous neighbouring places in search of a better life and the households back in the homeland receives remittances (Connell, 2007); some amount could also travel in the form of foreign and diasporic investments and could possibly fund some development projects as Keith Nurse (2004) speculates with reference to the Caribbean territories like Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and the Anglophone Caribbean. This is clearly an economic point-of-view, but is a partial account of migration. One must add, for a greater degree of clarity, that the prevailing problems of burglary, killings, drug-war and other violent conflicts in the Caribbean societies prepare a causal ground that forces a person to leave his/her country in search of a safer life.[3] Prevalence of violence and insecurity are antithetical to flourishing of the acquired human skills and social values because insecurity drives the people away.

Similarly, the Caribbean has an international "travel culture" which is otherwise known as tourism and is a significant source of income for almost all of its island nations (Caribbean Tourism Organisation, 2004; UNWTO, 2011). Again, traditionally seen as an inevitable source for development fund and earning, the foreign tourists are arguably contributing to increasing the HIV/AIDS cases in the Caribbean societies. It should act as an eye-opener that how this so-called source of development is turning into a source of human insecurity in the Caribbean. UNAIDS (2010) has reported rise in the HIV cases in the region, and Wendy Grenade (2008, p.24) has given the following reasons for its nexus with tourism: i) power differentials between a foreign visitor and a local person; ii) hedonistic nature of tourism in the region, and iii) adverse consequences of the structural adjustment programmes on human development due to downsizing of welfare roles of the states.

Furthermore, there are development costs of meeting the challenges of HIV/AIDS, violence and insecurity of various kinds in the Caribbean because these require channelling of budget funds from other vital accounts. At the

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functional purpose vis-à-vis development-security nexus.

3. Shaw (2013, p.1) aptly recognizes the multiple channels that are at work in the Caribbean and together generate a set of transnational relations: families, civil societies, supply chains, crime networks, and governance nexuses.

same time, as Rod-Larsen (2010, p.vii) would argue that there are impacts of economic and social development on security conditions. An "either-or" approach, therefore, on the Caribbean development is unlikely to yield the desired outcome. It is the framework of development-security nexus which seems promising for the Caribbean in today's international environment where an integrated and holistic approach is most likely to pass the test.

III. Concerning the United States' "Dominant Roll" of the Nexus

Meanwhile, a concern is rising from various quarters that the discourse on development and security and the mutually influencing contours of both (or the nexus) are gaining a specific colour while privileging the security front of the discourse. The concern is also regarding the discourse taking a "dominant roll" in favour of the United States and other industrially more advanced nations. This roll, though generally is an early 1990s anxiety, is said to becoming more explicit after the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) in the United States. These are the precise reasons for which Stern and Ojendal (2010, p.20) see development and security as mutually reinforcing idioms and techniques of biopower through which subjectivity, imagination and ultimately life are governed.

An intelligible understanding of the nexus has to acknowledge that the apparent privileging of the security front of the discourse is an informed anxiety and it rests on several grounds among which i) eagerness to know the (non-military) causes that trigger violent eruption of security threats; ii) initiation of pre-emptive measures by the United States to guard against such threat eruptions; and iii) the green-signalling of some of the causal explanations of development-security intersection as policy-prescription by some vital international organizations, including the United Nations, (followed by academic bolstering) are some of the important ones feeding the anxiety.

It is widely acknowledged by now that the release of the international order from bipolar tension had allowed several of the issues and problems to come up on the table. These were centred mainly on the people and trans-border issues in the "third world"; ethnic identities and underdevelopment/poverty were taken up as representatives of the core of the post-colonial third world dynamics. Another wider consensus was simultaneously becoming thicker that the world was increasingly integrating at various spheres and so were the issues and problems. Such an integration continues to be tagged as "globalization". Thus, the presumed post-Cold War consequence was the international ramification of the Caribbean third world dynamics impacting the United States and other industrially more developed nations and rendering them "insecure". This reading of the Caribbean and the third world crept

into the minds of those who wanted to decipher the non-military causes of 9/11 and inextricably linked the nexus between (the United States and first world) insecurity and (the Caribbean and third world) underdevelopment.

With this reading of the nexus, the actions that followed were to pre-empt any such security threats. Measures were taken up in the United States and other developed countries to detect the undocumented immigrants (especially the ones supposedly having criminal background) and deport them back to the country of origin. Some countries were invaded militarily to "save" them against so-called dictatorship and criminal outfits (Iraq and Afghanistan, for example); and security threats were collaboratively fore-stalled from occurring elsewhere (Solomon Islands, for example). Moreover, many of the states were levelled as "failing" or "failed" because their perfor-mance was rated poor in the ideal project-scale of state-building.[4] As a solu-tion, therefore, the then United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was quick to prescribe:

> Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is possible if poor countries are given a real chance to deve-lop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (United Nations, 2004, p.vii, cited in Stern and Ojendal, 2010, p.5)

Afterwards, as referred to previously, in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the United Nations explicitly proclaimed that there is no security without development and vice versa (Tschirgi *et al.* 2010, p.2; Rod-Larsen, 2010, p.vii). The observation thus has been repeatedly made that the con-cern with the intersection of security and development has gained consider-able academic and policy attention (Berger and Weber, 2009; Duffield, 2010, p.54; Stern and Ojendal, 2010, p.6; Rod-Larsen, 2010, p.vii).

It should, however, be pointed out that the concerned dominant roll of the development-security nexus has not apparently taken place with ex-plicit reference to the Caribbean states. It seems that the roll has occurred while keeping with the mainstream practices of excluding the small islands

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4. See Kamil Shah's (2009) article "The Failure of State Building and the Promise of State Failure: Reinterpreting the Security-Development Nexus in Haiti" to know how the key assumptions underpinning mainstream approaches to resolving concerns of security and development through the project of contemporary state-building is problematique.

of this region from the domain of international politics and legitimizing their long-standing grievance of turning them as "system-takers". This American dominant roll of the discourse may have occurred in some other context, it is further notable that the practices concerning the development-security nexus nevertheless have heavily worked upon the formative identities and images of the Caribbean states which are seen with a *different light*.

These island nations are the neighbours of the big, powerful, and immigrants' destination countries with high living standards such as the United States and Canada. Thus, international migration to these countries from the Caribbean region has taken almost a form of a family norm and practice. Issues surrounding migrant remittances and impact of such migrations on these island countries are thus raised (Connell, 2007; Merz, 2009) as often as the issue of drug-trafficking is observed since several of these states are used as trans-shipment points (Griffith, 1993, p.243-275; 2003). Since the routes to drug-trafficking (security matter) and (undocumented) migration (development issue) are believed to be similar, they appear to collide especially in the eye of an American observer. This belief is further encouraged by lack of adequate detecting and policing capacity of such routes by the small and micro states of this region. The violent incidents of 9/11 have added to the perception that those routes can be utilized for further attacks and, as Don Marshall (2009) hints on the discourse, even the offshore financial institutions present in some of these island countries could be linked with such motives.[5]

While these concerns remain in their places and continue to inform the nature of development-security intersection from *without,* a long-standing understanding that these states are *small* and *micro* –and thus vulnerable– has been imperative for a dialogue to take place. More importantly, the concern with the dominant view of the nexus is quit relevant, recognition of the development-security problematique from *within* (as the preceding section attempts) is more vital to the Caribbean. It is detrimental for this island-studded region to ignore the interfaces that a number of issues together cause for; so is the reckless practice of interpreting the interfaces either from security angle or from economic point of view. Confining the issues of conflict and international migration, population out-flow, trafficking in various forms, HIV/AIDS, and similar other problems within a narrow purview may rather encourage them for further expansion and complication. Thus, sooner

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5. See Ujjwal Rabidas (2016a) for an update on the reading of the development-security nexus through recent revelation of the "Panama Papers" or "tax havens" as possible new threats in row to the Caribbean SIDS.

the application of the comprehensive approach, better for the states in the Caribbean.

If one historically engages with the identities and images of the Caribbean states, it reveals that these entities have been strongly influenced by the economic needs and political desires of the power-wielding and mercantile states from time to time since this region had encountered them. Those needs and desires were close-knitted and were beyond the confines of local and national. Moreover, before the Caribbean nations could breathe fresh air post-independence and organise their political economy in an appropriate manner, they found themselves with strings of sovereign statehood attached with a perceived characteristic image of being "small" and thus "vulnerable" to a number of stated natural and anthropogenic conditions.

Though the dominant roll of the development-security nexus has robustly taken place with a specific colour, the very possibility is that there is no shying away from the nexus. The nexus has emerged as a *historical* phenomenon for the Caribbean states. It appears as accurate for these entities as the recognition of the existence of an international order for the modern political life. Today the expression of a "changing world" has become a commonplace; the development-security nexus is a tool to be wisely and creatively exploited by the Caribbean islands to delve deep into the contemporary world and actively search for the ways out of the crossroads on which, however, the nexus does not stand alone. The development-security nexus is surrounded with an increasingly complex international environment where an associated "diplomatic point-of-view" holds the possibility of translating the nexus into further usefully practicable lead principle.

IV. A Diplomatic Point-of-View

Situating the predicament of the Caribbean development within the growing complexity of the international environment prevents one to think and act in simple black and white terms. There are issues in the Caribbean for which the history of the "wider world" has been certainly responsible. Historically shaped structural constraints of political economy falling in this sort, for instance, were passively received in the region. It would, however, be a fallacy to bestow the culpability only on the wider world the way the national leaderships in several of the island nations in the Caribbean appear to have operated on interethnic, developmental, and other national issues. The limited space constrains full elaboration of the issues here, still operation of the leaderships in Guyana and Haiti and the out-flow of people from these countries, for example, are not to be presumed with domestic disconnections while studying the role of the wider world in such out-flows (Shah, 2009;

Mars, 2010). Similarly, the repeated malfunctioning of the regional and sub-regional networks in the Caribbean requires subjecting it to a double-aged inquiry holding both the internal and the external accountable for their respective degrees of involvement. How are the Caribbean states, therefore, to take the next step in today's international complexity and with the identified development-security nexus while including the United States' dimension? How far the proposition of a "diplomatic point-of-view" can assist the Caribbean to sail through the development crossroads and the hurdles?

With a diplomatic point-of-view in mind, projection of a positive image nurtured with the belief in a good, peaceful, and progressive life as well as sustenance of this image appear foremost worth pursuing. This connects overtly with the American dominant attempt that portraits the image of the Caribbean small island nations as dangerous places with unrest, volatilities, and poverty. Projection of a positive image thus has to embed with the aim to let the dominant view be informed about the nature of unrest and poverty that does not correspond with its reading of these problems in the Caribbean societies. Even simple partition of the world on material parameters as "developed", "developing", and "underdeveloped" suggests that reading the heterogeneous profile of poverty with a homogenized mind is unscientific. Thus, the "third world" poverty that informs the core of the homogenized generalization of the Caribbean development-security nexus is to be juxtapozed with the fact that the Caribbean region as a whole is relatively *less underprivileged* than its counterparts in Asia Pacific and Africa; the nature of poverty therefore is not uniform. The region falls somewhere between third world poverty and first world riches.[6]

It is to be further underscored that this in-betweenity (between the first and the third) is doubly advantageous for the Caribbean countries. It brings them close to the third world for need of solidarity and also helps connect with the first one when there is necessity; increasing the chances of success of various policy initiatives. A diplomatic approach to one's own being is thus an asset in itself that allows an advantage of this kind to be captured by the Caribbean region. It even exposes the Caribbean developmental problematique to the conditions that govern today's world. The terms like competition,

6. Philippe Hein (2004, p.10) noted in an UNCTAD/UN report: "In a context where available data showed that SIDS [small island developing states] tended to fare better, in terms of per capita income and quality of life, than most other developing countries, there was concern that the validity of the category as being 'disadvantaged' and meriting special attention might be questioned. At the same time, arguments based on the disadvantage of remoteness were also becoming less convincing, as air access to most SIDS was improving (as a result of tourism), international transport costs were decreasing, and progress in telecommunications was reducing the disadvantage of distance."

resilience, and opportunity are widely used today in the context of a globalizing world as well as in the Caribbean context with accompanied dictums of instability, vulnerability, and risk (Rabidas, 2016b). A world of this kind is of definitive relevance for the Caribbean islands if tuned with their discrete existential veracity.

A globalizing world is redrawing its map and creating new proximities between the neighbouring states and the regions. The expressed dominant American view on the formative nature of development-security nexus may not always be true but the very view could have been largely influenced by the integrating spheres where issues and actors move around with unprecedented velocity and significance. This was probably the reason that once the United States had declared itself a "Caribbean State" in 1997 (Anthony Payne, 1998). For any constructive dialogue, therefore, the nations in the Caribbean region now have to take this perception into account which *however* may undoubtedly complicate the possibility of redressal of any legitimate grievance against this big and powerful neighbour; but its denial is diplomatically jeopardic and developmentally constraining.

Further, the image projection is crucial for the Caribbean and which requires it to understand that despite the "insecurity" projection by this neighbouring giant, it does not shy away from fulfilling its own economic interests in the backdrop of caricatured security threats.[7] This context is a useful reminder to the states in the Caribbean region of the economic and developmental dynamisms that diplomacy itself has gained over the period. While Donna Lee and David Hudson (2004, p.345), for example, assert that commercial interests have always been integral part of diplomatic practices and its form is currently changing, they further add:

> ...we may well be witnessing substantively significant changes to the practice of diplomacy in the twenty-first century: changes that are fashioned by commercial interests. What are the key features of this diplomacy? First, it combines the economic and the political at both domestic and international levels. Second, government-business partnerships have become the key organising principle as well as an attribute of the state in the world economy. Third, the public interest is conceptualised as a collective expression of private interests (Lee and Hudson, 2004, p.344).

7. For details, see a study by this author that delineates how the United States strategically combines its business interests with security projections in the Caribbean. The reference for the available study is: Ujjwal Rabidas (2014).

If the above facet of diplomacy is in the action of any big state, for instance, the consequence cannot be kept secluded from the public gaze; whereas it could be an advantage with a small Caribbean island whose move is not always the subject of scrutiny. In his "Omani perspective", therefore, Badr Bin Hadam Al Bu Said (2003, p.354) has the following to say: "In the space between the big states, the major powers, both regional and global, we have room for manoeuvre that big states themselves do not enjoy."

A further room for manoeuvre lies with the significant diasporic connections that several of the Caribbean island societies have developed with their respective neighbouring big states over the period. So far, this "soft" element of diasporic connection has been looked at from migrant remittances and "brain-drain" point-of-views. Even the aspects of development have been recently brought in within the ambit of diaspora research (Merz *et al.* 2009). But the idea since long has existed that the diasporas can play "soft" political roles for the "homeland" and are catalytic assets for the "hostland", and there are examples available from people of the Croatian, Romanian, and other nationalities who are settled in foreign lands.[8] Thus, Ramon Grosfoguel's (1997) observation that the United States fostering migration from certain Caribbean states like Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico had its own geopolitical dynamics during the Cold War and after. Grosfoguel's observation indicates a larger scene that the states in the Caribbean have to understand vis-à-vis the current problematique of development-security nexus and the consequent necessity of the projection of a favourable image. This soft dimension can be employed to overcome the dearth of diplomatic expertise and political resources that arguably constrain the developmental policy moves in the Caribbean.[9] In this context, the observation made by Lomarsh Roopnarine (2005, p.107) while referring to the East Indians in the Caribbean is instructive:

> Intra-island migration of Caribbean East Indians is not totally pushed by depressed local conditions and pulled by the appeal for better life chances. Rather, intra Caribbean East Indian migratory

8. There are known academic acknowledgments of the remarkable political contributions made for their respective "homelands" by the diasporics of different nationalities. Gabriel Popescu (2005), for example, talks about the role of the US-based Romanian diaspora to attempt to influence the American political establishment to grant NATO membership to Romania during NATO's 1997 expansion. Similarly, Sean Carter (2005; 2007) talks about the role of the US-based Croatian diaspora in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.

9. Interestingly, Godfrey Baldacchino (2009, p.26) has included a state's inability to provide overseas representation among the criteria to define a small state and is fittingly applicable in the Caribbean.

behaviours are more agents of a "brain exchange" rather than a "brain drain" phenomenon.

Thus, a diplomatic point-of-view as a whole does at least two things in the context of the Caribbean development. First, it positions the images and identity(s) of the states within the intricacies of the "political" and consequently enlarges the scope where a bargaining could take place as to how a Caribbean state intends to be identified among the juridical equals keeping its developmental imperative in view. It thus holds the possibility of a constructive engagement with the wider world, and specifically the United States, that geographical smallness of the Caribbean islands causes politically or diplomatically. Second, it allows the Caribbean states to take into account the vast swathe of developments that are already taking place (or could further take place) around the globe where, like the problematique of development-security intersection itself, there could be many integrative layers of interaction in today's complex international environment and where the Caribbean has to endeavour for more measured approximation.

V. Concluding Remarks

One could think about the preceding diplomatic standpoint as appearing somewhat internally paradoxical because it proposes the very issues for a favourable image construction that are easy-prey of the *dominant* articulation of the development-security nexus. Such a view in search of a paradox is rather more naive than factual and runs contrary to the essence of diplomacy. It is more like looking at innovations in science and technology as constraining the negotiated bargainings and adapting to those retarding attitudes rather than employing a diplomatic point-of-view and improving on the "learning curve" (Steiner, 2004, p.498). The development-security nexus is to be precisely treated as a learning curve that works as a yardstick for the Caribbean along with containing the ground-efforts to improve on the socio-economic indices for a better life and also serving as a point of reference against the imposed strictures and caricatured security threats from the American perspective. It thus calls for diplomatic bearing and constructive engagement with today's complexities by the island countries of the region while keeping the nexus as the lead guiding principle.

Keeping the perspective tuned with the said development-security nexus, the Caribbean states thus need to confront the nucleus of the dominant roll of the nexus with strategically moving up on the development issues while adding a security angle to it. The Caribbean, for instance, has been deeply apprehensive of the "competitive and reciprocal" trade practices as

these have been speeded up since the early 1990s. With the earlier prefer-ential trade arrangements turning into "partnerships", the Caribbean states have lost a significant part of aid and trade concessions and that have ad-versely impacted their overall political and economic milieus. Karin Arts and Jessica Byron (1997, p.74) thus have observed that these countries have to compete in the market in the changed economic scenario. But why were the issues of so-called reciprocity and partnership with the Caribbean nations gaining momentum in the early 1990s? Today the sphere of the interna-tional political economy may appear substantially very real, it is apparently besieged by the ubiquitous process of "globalization"; and the term is indis-criminately evoked to justify an economic move whether it is indispensable or not. In Jens Bartelson's (2000, p.180-181) words: "...nothing changes the world like the collective belief that it is changing, albeit rarely in directions desired by the believers." The reciprocal moves on the economic front in the early 1990s thus appear persuasive as that was the period when the process of globalization was becoming a catchphrase with ever increasing stress. But it is to be asked that how far the role of a regressive "threat of communism" in the Caribbean was appreciated within the economic move in the early 1990s. As Roberto Espindola (1987, p.65) would argue in the Cold War context, the Caribbean states were the means to force a rival to stretch its political and military resources away from the main theatres and acquire additional bargaining pawns. Likewise, it is useful to bear in mind that almost all the salient image-characterizations of the Caribbean island nations in negative connotation had happened in the context of a war-environment in a larger setting even before Jonathan Swift's imagination of Lemuel Gulliver's travel to the "Lilliput". Those image-characterizations were subsequently strat-egized by more than one great powers for their own interests that contin-ued with changing forms during the Cold War and after (Rabidas, 2014). The post-Cold War reciprocal moves were thus viewed from a "pragmatist" spectrum towards this "vulnerable" island-studded region as "communism" no longer threatened to stretch the resources away for additional bargain-ing pawns. Moreover, as the chances of salvaging of the earlier preferential facilities for the Caribbean have increasingly become bleak, the new-found post-9/11 threats and the subsequent economic crisis have hardened the operation of any simplified rule and it is aptly exemplified by the post-9/11 formative-ground of the development-security nexus. Yet the apparent op-timism in this study is that the nexus could allow these Caribbean states to appreciate development as a societal goal and as a policy to achieve that goal within its wider spectre. Earlier the existence of such a possibility for these island nations was not so obvious and so was not the chance to fight negative image-characterizations.

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